Standard theories of international trade assume that all countries use similar and exogenous technologies in the production of any good. This paper relaxes this assumption by allowing for the adoption of various factor-complementary machines. The marriage of literatures on biased technical change and trade yields a tractable theory, which predicts that differences in factor endowments bias technical change towards particular factor intensities, and thus unit factor input requirements vary across economies. Using data on net-exports of a single industry, computers, and factor endowments for 73 countries over the period 1980-2000, the paper shows that once technological choices are considered, countries with different factor endowments can become net exporters of the same product. (JEL Code: F1, F11, F12)
Introduction
Theories of international trade, such as the factor proportions model, often assume that countries use similar technologies in production or that technological differences are Hicks neutral. 1 In contrast, models of biased technical change assert that innovation and technology adoption are determined by local factor endowments. This paper marries these two literatures. It proposes a matching mechanism between factor endowments and technologies in open economies, and it studies how the cross-country pattern of trade changes once technology choices are considered. The theory concerns economies that are open and differ in their factor endowments. Economies are composed of multiple goods, which can be produced with a range of factor-complementary machines. These machines are traded in a global market, which is characterized by a monopolistic competitive structure. The model is tractable even though it predicts that unit factor input requirements within industries vary across countries.
The econometric analysis utilizes data on factor endowments and netexports of computers and components, an industry that has received much attention in the technology adoption and growth literature. The data set covers 73 countries during 1980-2000. The empirical model tests for the existence of multiple technological country groups in the data, and estimates the factor proportions model in a two-stage estimation procedure. The technology selection function is modeled as an Ordered Probit. The trade specialization equation follows closely the standard specification of Rybczinski functions found in the trade literature.
The econometric results suggest the existence of up to four distinct technological groups that differ in terms of their unit factor input requirements in the production of computers. The evidence rejects the hypothesis that the set of estimated Rybczinski coefficients are statistically equivalent across 1 The term factor-proportions refers both to relative abundance of factors of production and relative intensity with which different factors of production are used in the production of different goods. As Krugman [19] explains, ..."because the Heckscher-Ohlin theory emphasizes the interplay between the proportions in which different factors of production are available in different countries and the proportions in which they are used in producing different goods, it is also referred to as the factor-proportion theory.
technological country groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 solves the equilibrium of the model. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
At least two distinct literatures are related to our model and empirical application. The first one is the trade literature on factor proportions and trade patterns. The second one concerns biased technical change.
Trade and factor proportions
This literature can be divided into two different strands of research. One explores the implications of the factor proportions theory under the assumption that all countries have access to the same technologies. A second literature conducts the same analysis but assumes that there are Hicks-neutral technology differences across countries.
In the first strand of research, Harrigan [14] examines the production side of the factor proportions model. The author employs manufacturing outputs and factor endowments data for up to 20 OECD countries during [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] . The most robust evidence suggests that capital abundance is a source of comparative advantage in most of the sectors, but the effects of skilled-and unskilled-labor are not clear. The sign of the Rybczynski coefficients change across econometric specifications. In particular, under the time-varying parameter model, which yields the most precise coefficient estimates, skilledlabor is a modest source of comparative advantage in only two industries (Iron and Steel, and Fabricated Metal Products), while it is a source of comparative disadvantage in the other sectors. Its largest negative effect is observed in the Food industry. By contrast, unskilled-labor has positive effects on industry output in six of the nine industries, while land has a negligible effect in all the manufacturing sectors.
In the same vein, but motivated by a slightly different question, Schott [26] investigates whether developed and developing countries specialize in different subsets of products as a result of their differences in factor endowments. He proposes a methodology that distinguishes single-from multiple-cone equilibria and allows for the effect of factor accumulation on a given sector's output to vary with a country's endowments. Schott [26] uses value-added, capital stock, and employment data from UNIDO for up to 45 developed and developing countries across 28 manufacturing industries in 1990. The findings reject the single-cone framework in favor of a two-cone model with laborabundant countries producing relatively little of the most capital-intensive goods. Interestingly, the estimated development paths for industries such as Transportation, Food, Electrical Machinery and Machinery display a twinpeaked pattern, thus suggesting that within these sectors labor-abundant countries produce the less capital-intensive goods, while capital-abundant economies specialize in the production of the most capital-intensive products.
Romalis [25] examines how factor proportions determine the structure of commodity trade by integrating a multicountry version of the HeckscherOhlin model with a continuum of goods with Krugman [18] 's model of monopolistic competition and transport costs. His model assumes that there are no factor intensity reversals and that factor shares are fixed within industries and across countries. Two main predictions emerge from this work. First, countries capture larger shares of world production and trade of commodities that more intensively use their abundant factors. Second, prediction shows that countries that rapidly accumulate a factor see their production and export structures systematically shift towards industries that intensively use that factor.
In the second strand of the trade literature, Harrigan [15] provides the first empirical test of the factor proportions theory in a framework that accounts for international technology differences. To estimate this model, the author uses manufacturing output shares and factor endowments data for up to 10 developed countries across 7 industries with data from 1970-1988. The most reliable inferences across sectors that can be obtained from this study are roughly consistent with Leamer [20] and Harrigan [14] . Specifically, the results indicate that capital and medium-educated workers are associated with larger GDP output shares in most of the seven industries (Food, Apparel, Paper, Chemicals, Glass, Metals and Machinery); while non-residential construction and high-educated workers are related to lower output shares.
Harrigan [15] improves substantially upon previous empirical frameworks, but his implementation has the disadvantage that the model does not exploit cross-country variation to help identify the effect of factor supplies on specialization because it only uses data on OECD countries, which tend to have similar factor endowments and sectoral output shares. To overcome this drawback, Harrigan and Zakrajsek [16] extend that study and work with a larger sample, which includes data for up to 28 OECD and non-OECD countries and 12 industries from 1970-1992. Their evidence favors the neoclassical theory. In Food, Wood-Paper and Oil-Coal capital abundance reduces output shares while labor abundance raises them; Fabricated Metals and Machinery sectors are capital intensive but not land intensive. The impact of factor endowments on the Apparel-Textile sector is difficult to ascertain because the signs of the estimated coefficients change across specifications. The between (cross-sectional) estimates confirm the intuition about this sector, namely that countries that are land and capital scarce but labor abundant specialize in this industry. The country fixed-effects estimates however show that increases in skilled-labor over time reduce output.
In a related article, Fitzgerald and Hallak [12] estimate the effect of factor endowments on the pattern of manufacturing specialization in a cross-section of OECD countries, taking into account that factor accumulation responds to productivity. The authors show that the failure to control for productivity differences produces biased estimates. Their model explains 2/3 of the observed differences in the pattern of specialization between the poorest and richest OECD countries. However, because factor proportions and the pattern of specialization co-move in the development process, their strong empirical relationship is not sufficient to determine whether specialization is driven by factor endowments, or by other mechanisms also correlated with level of development.
Using the framework proposed by Harrigan [14] , but concerned with analyzing the role of factor endowments on specialization dynamics, Redding [24] utilizes distribution dynamics to explore this issue. In his framework, a country's pattern of specialization at any point in time is characterized by the distribution of shares of GDP across industries. Its dynamics are represented by the evolution of the entire cross-sectional distribution over time. To implement the model Redding [24] employs data on 20 industries in 7 OECD countries from . A comparison of GDP shares between 1970 and 1990 reveals substantial variation across sectors and countries. For example, the share of manufactures in GDP declines in all countries, although the rate of decline varies considerably across economies, from a decline of 30.6% in the United Kingdom to 10.1% in Denmark. There are also notable changes in the relative importance of individual sectors within manufacturing. Some sectors (e.g. Textiles and Ferrous metals) declined while others (e.g. Drugs and Radio/TV) rose. The rate of decline or increase varies noticeably across countries. For example, in Radio/TV, the rate of increase ranges from 19.8% in the United Kingdom to 62.5% in Japan and 297.6% in Finland.
Perhaps more importantly, Redding [24] concludes that in the short run, common cross-country effects such as technology progress are more important in explaining observed changes in specialization than factor endowments for the majority of the countries. Over longer periods, factor endowments become relatively more important, and in the infinite horizon, factor endowments account for most of the observed variation in specialization. This evidence is in line with the idea that changes in relative factor abundance occur gradually and take time to impact on outputs structures.
Overall, the factor proportions model provides a story about static and dynamic specialization around the world. Some evidence shows that technological differences across countries can produce similar patterns of specialization in spite of large differences in factor endowments (Schott[26] ). Our model extends the standard factor-proportions theory to allow for technology differences across countries.
Biased technical change
This literature concerns the hypothesis that countries use different factorcomplementary machines to produce the same products. This strand of re-search can also be divided into two different approaches. The first one assesses whether factor shares vary systematically with the level of development (e.g. Young [27] , Gollin [13] , Bernanke and Gurkaynak [3] , and Ortega and Rodriguez [22] ). The second investigates whether complementarities between inputs and technology bias technical change (e.g. Acemoglu [1] , Caselli [?] ).
The first literature initially found that labor shares in national income vary widely, ranging from 0.05 to 0.80 in international cross-sectional data (e.g. Elias [10] and Young [27] ). Gollin [13] questioned these estimations by arguing that the widely used approach, which is based on Cobb-Douglas production functions, tends to underestimate the labor income of self-employed workers, and the corrected labor shares fall in the range of 0.65 to 0.80. This evidence was later reaffirmed by Bernanke and Gurkaynak [3] , but rejected by Ortega and Rodriguez [22] . The later uses industrial survey data to explore the same question, and controlling for the measurement problem of self-employed workers it found a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between capital share and per capita income within industries. In a related paper, Dobbelaere and Mairesse [9] , find that imperfections in the product and labor markets generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, both at firm and industry level.
In the second approach, Acemoglu [1] shows how cross-country differences in factor endowments can bias technical change. In his framework, two forces shape technical change, price and market-size effects. The price effect reflects the incentives to generate technologies that create more expensive goods. The second effect captures the incentives to produce technologies for which there is a big market. While the former encourages innovations to complement scarce factors, the latter leads to technical change favoring abundant factors. The elasticity of substitution between two different factors determines how powerful these effects are. In the long run, technical change favors the abundant factor if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently large.
Evidence of complementarities between factors of production and technology has been provided by Caselli[?] , who explored the relationship between factor endowments and the composition of capital imports. The author finds that human-capital abundant countries devote a larger share of their in-vestment to acquire complex technologies, which can only be employed by skilled-workers.
We depart from the neo-classical trade literature by relaxing the assumption of Hicks neutral technologies, and by allowing countries to make their own technology choices. We complement the biased-technical change literature by analyzing how countries' technology choices alter the impact of factor endowments on trade.
Model
Let c=1 , . . . , C index countries, let f =1 , . . . , F index factors, and let j = 1 , . . . , J index industries. Countries are open to trade in goods and technology. They differ in factor endowments as well as in institutional frameworks, which determine the degree of intellectual property rights protection, φ c . Each economy has two sectors, a final good and a R&D sector.
Final good sector
Output of industry j in country c, Y 
γ jf ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution parameter that captures how important factor f is in the production of output j. We assume F f =1 γ jf = 1. Parameter σ j is the elasticity of substitution between two factors. Because of the absence of trade barriers, international trade equalizes prices. We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the price of output j is equal to 1.
The set of complementary machines,Ã Final goods producers face a two-stage decision process. First, they decide how many units of each factor to hire. Second, they choose how many machines to buy to complement each factor. To do so, they take technology prices as given.
R&D sector
The R&D sector produces machines to complement factors of production. The machines belong to the category of general purpose technologies and they can be employed in different sectors. The world's technological market has a monopolistic competitive structure. Each monopolist that produces a machine of type i, which complements factor f, faces a marginal cost of production equal to µ f , and sets a price, p f (i), per unit of machine he sells. 
Equilibrium
To find the equilibrium of the model we proceed in the following manner. First, we solve the equilibrium for a representative firm of a representative sector. Second, we characterize the equilibrium for the whole economy. To solve the equilibrium for a sector we need to find the solutions to the final good producers' problem and the technology suppliers'problem. This is presented in the following sections.
Final Good Producers
Firms choose how many machines to buy in order to complement each factor of production. 2 The problem for a representative firm in sector j can be written as follows:
subject to the following constraints:
The first order conditions for problem (3) deliver the following expression for the demand of machine i per unit of output j :
e c jf represents the expenditure that country c devotes to complement factor f per unit of output j ; P is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of machines f. Equation (4) implies that the demand of machine i is an increasing function of the real expenditure available to buy technology f, Given the demand for machines, firms minimize unit cost functions to determine the optimal unit factor input requirements. They solve the following problem:
where w c f represents the cost per unit of factor f in country c. In the optimum, each factor's marginal product equals its marginal cost. Because optimization is subject to the unit isoquant, we change the notation, and we denote by Q c jf the optimal requirements of factor f per unit of output j in country c. These requirements can be written as follows:
wherew c f is the cost per efficiency unit of factor f andã
α . Equation (6) shows that unit factor input requirements vary across economies due to two reasons: absolute and relative technology choices, and relative factor prices. 4 The impact of technology adoption can be decomposed into two effects: a factor saving effect and a relative efficiency effect. According to the first effect, larger values ofã c jf increase the productivity of the factor and reduce its requirements. Due to the second effect, factor f becomes relatively more productive than other factors, which increases firms' incentives to hire more units. The sign of the net-effect depends on which effect dominates. Lower values ofw c f (γ jz ), and increasingly negative (positive) differences betweenw c f (γ jf ) andw c z (γ jz ), for z = f and z = 1, ...F , make the second effect more prominent.
In contrast with the standard theory, our model shows that unit factor input requirements can vary across countries because of differences in factor prices, adjusted and non-adjusted by differences in productivity. In this regard, our model rationalizes Repetto and Ventura's[?] findings, that factor prices do differ systematically across countries, even after controlling for productivity differences.
Technology Suppliers
A monopolist from country o that sells machines to complement factor f in country d solves the following problem:
which delivers the following solution:
The optimal price is a constant markup over the marginal cost of producing the machine. The monopolist exports the technology to country d if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
which can be rewritten as follows:
where 
is lower than 1. Because the number of countries and factors is finite, there is a finite number of technological groups. Two countries belong to the same group if they acquire the same type of technologies.
To finish characterizing the equilibrium at firm level, we introduce equation (8) into equation (4), and we write a
Notice that the number of varieties of factor-f -complementary machines that
where D is the set of countries that provide technology to country d, is a function of the number of varieties that country o offers to complement factor f, N of .
To formalize the free entry condition in country o, assume there is a fixed cost of innovating equal to η o f . Entry occurs until the marginal firm in country o just breaks even. This condition can be written as follows:
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition in brackets is satisfied, N 
where
is the set of factor endowments of the countries that produce output j and provide technology to country d. Inserting equation (13) into equation (6) we can write unit factor input requirements as a function of the parameters of the model. For z = 1, ..., Z, the unit factor input requirements can be written as a function g of the following arguments:
, w
The Economy
To analyze how technology choices affect the impact of factor endowments on trade, we need to solve the equilibrium for the whole economy. Employing matrix notation, we define Q c as the matrix of unit factor input requirements for economy c. Market clearing conditions in this economy are as follows:
where Y c is the vector of sectoral outputs and V c is the vector of factor endowments. Assuming that the number of goods is equal to the number of products, and denoting by R c the inverse of matrix Q c , it is possible to express output of country c as a linear function of country c's factor endowments. Specifically,
We have seen in the previous section that in equilibrium, there will be a finite number of technological groups, and we let the data to tell us about the particular number. However, in order to study the implications of technology choices on the pattern of specialization, assume that countries are clustered in K groups. Output of country c, which belongs to group k, Y c,k , with k = 1, ..., K, and worldwide output, Y w , can be written as follows:
and
respectively. V w,k is the vector of factor endowments of group k. Denoting by T B c the trade balance of country c and by s c country c's share of world consumption, net-exports of this economy can be written as follows:
The previous system provides the following estimating equation for the netexports of country c in sector j, where c belongs to technology group k :
Equation (20) relates net-exports of product j in country c, which belong to technology group k, with measures of relative abundance of factors f -with f = 1, ..., F -in country c and a pure consumption effect, which captures the impact of importing product j from countries that belong to other technological groups. The r k f j s are the analogue to the Rybczynski coefficients in the standard theory. However, in our model, the concept of relative abundance of a factor in a country is redefined, so that a country's endowments are compared to the endowments of the technological group to which it belongs instead of being compared to the world's endowments, as in the standard theory. Adding and subtracting (20), we can re-write it as follows:
where V w f stands for the world's endowment of factor f. Equation (21) shows that countries that belong to technological regime k will relatively export more units of output j to the world than physical abundance alone would suggest, if countries of group k employ techniques that economize the need of the factors used intensively in the production of output j. The equation also implies that countries that are scarce in those factors can be net-exporters of product j if their technological advantage more than offset their endowment disadvantage.
Empirical Strategy
This section presents the empirical implementation we conduct to assess the validity of the theory. The analysis focuses on the computer industry, which has received a lot of attention in the technology adoption and growth literature. The analysis explores both, the case of the global computer industry, which includes final goods and components, and that of final goods.
The section is structured as follows. First, we present the estimating procedure we employ to test the theory. Second, we describe the indicators and proxies we construct for the same purpose. Third, we provide a preliminary analysis of the data. Finally, we present and discuss our findings.
Estimating procedure
The theoretical framework motivates an empirical model which consists of two equations as net-exports determination is governed by different sets of parameters, and the set of parameters which determine a particular country's net-exports depend on the technological group to which the country belongs.
The most efficient method to estimate this model is the Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator (see Chiburis and Lokshin [7] ). However, we employ the least efficient method, the Two-Step approach, as it performs better than the FIML with small samples. A relevant implication of relying on the Two-Step approach to test our model is that the procedure increases the chance of rejecting the theory, as it delivers larger intervals of confidence for the estimated parameters. This fact implies that if we find evidence in line with our predictions, then our theory is very robust. However, evidence against the theoretical results may not enough to reject the theory.
Two-step approach
In the first step we estimate an Ordered-Probit equation and we cluster countries across technological groups. To do so, we construct an index of technology choices based on the theory, and we estimate the locations of the cutoff points at which the sample splits across technological regimes.
To estimate such points, we proceed in the following manner. First, we assume the sample splits in a particular number of groups i.e., 2, 3, or 4, and we estimate the model under the assumed number of regimes. In doing so, we follow the methodology implemented by Hotchkiss [17] , which consists in estimating the model for every reasonable value of the cutoffs. 5 Given such values, in the second step, we estimate the Rybczynski coefficients for each technological group. For such purpose, we employ the OLS approach but we control for selection. 6 Finally, we apply the goodness of fit criterium to identify the set of estimated parameters that best fits the data. Our specification is as follows. 5 We start the process dividing the sample in a way that delivers the maximum number of groups with no more than 10% of the observations per each one. This provides the highest degree of freedom to move the cut-off points along the range of possible values. The cutoff points are moved iteratively in steps of 1 percentile of the continuous variable we employ to cluster countries across technological regimes. 6 Specifically, we introduce the estimatedλ
as an explanatory variable of the Rybczynski equation corresponding to regime i. 
where R c t is the continuous variable that we construct to cluster countries across technological regimes.
7 Θ is a vector of parameters and Z c t is a vector that includes some of the variables we employ to build R c t .
8 µ c t is a standard normal shock, and R 1t , R 2t , ..., R K−1t are the unknown cutoff points, which satisfy the following condition: R 1t < R 2t <, ...,< R K−1t . We also define R 0t ≡ −∞ and R Kt ≡ ∞ to avoid having to handle the boundary cases separately.
Second-stage (Rybczynski equations):
The following section explain the methodology, the variables, and the economic arguments on which we rely to build it. 8 Our baseline model includes regressors that are strictly related to technology adoption such as IPRs of each country, capital/labor ratio of each country, which we use to proxy 
N X
We include four factors of production: stock of capital, skilled-labor, unskilled-labor, and arable land. Given that in the economy there are more than four sectors; the constant term, r 0 , captures the mean effect of omitted factors.
9 Finally, our model relies on the following 
Indicators and proxies
This section describes the proxies we construct to estimate equations (22) and (23) . It also documents the sources of data we employ for such purpose.
The technology selection variable
To construct variable R
There is certain circularity in this step. However, as far as the main goal of this step is to identify the cutoffs point at which the sample splits across regimes, instead of testing the existence of any association between the dependent and the independent variables, this circularity is empirically irrelevant.
Data Factor endowments
Data on capital stocks come from Serven and Calderón [26] , who extend the series provided by Penn World Tables. The labor force is from the International Labor Organization (ILO), and it refers to the population economically active which have between 25-64 years old. To calculate endowments of high-and low-skilled labor, we use data on educational attainment from Barro and Lee [2] . Skilled-workers are defined as the population economically active which have attained at least one year of secondary school. The rest is considered unskilled-labor. The endowment of arable land comes from the World Bank's World Tables and it is defined as hectares of arable land.
IPRs
Data on intellectual property rights protection come from Park and Ginarte [23] . The measure is an index of patent rights at country level, which is based on the following categories: extent of patent coverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. Each of these categories is scored a value ranging from 0 to 1. The un-weighted sum of these five values constitutes the overall value of the IPRs index.
Net exports of computers
Bilateral data on imports and exports of computers come from Feenstra et al. [11] . The data are available at 4-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 2. To measure net exports of computers for the global industry, we consider the following categories, 7521, 7522, 7523, and 7528, which are the same as the ones employed by Caselli and Coleman [6] to study the determinants of cross-country technology diffusion. Code 7521 refers to Analogue and hybrid data processing machines; code 7522 refers to Complete digital data processing machines, comprising in the same housing the central processing unit and one output unit; code 7523 refers to Complete digital central processing units, digital processors consisting of arithmetical, logical, and control elements; codes 7528 refers to Off-line data processing equipment, n.e.s. To measure net exports of the computers in the final good industry we restrict our analysis to the 7521 and 7522 codes.
The resulting sample covers 73 developing and developed countries over the period 1980-2000. Table 1 presents summary statistics of these variables. The Appendix presents a description of other variables employed for robustness checks purposes.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Data analysis
The analysis of this section relies on Table 2 , which presents a list of the countries that are located at the top and the bottom of the distribution of countries ranked according to their net-exports of computers during the year 2000. For these countries the table reports their net-exports of computers, their capital/labor ratios, their skilled-labor/labor ratios, and the positions the countries occupy in the rankings of countries for each of these variables. Each ranking ranges from 1-73, and lower values refers to countries that are located at the top of the country list.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To explore if the data supports preliminarily our theory, or if by contrast, it provides evidence in line with the neo-classical theory, we compare the positions countries occupy in the net-exports and relative factor endowments distributions. According to the standard theory, if the production of computers is capital (skilled labor) intensive, we should expect to observe countries that are relatively more abundant in this factor to be located at the top of the net-exports of computers distribution.
Interestingly, the pattern that Table 2 portraits distance remarkably from what the neo-classical theory predicts. For example, for the case of the global computer industry, we observe that among the set of capital abundant countries, there are countries such as Korea Republic, Singapore, and Japan, which are among the top net-exporters of computers, and others such as Switzerland, U.S.A, Italy, and France, which are located at the bottom of the net-exports of computers distribution. Skilled-labor abundant countries such as Korea Republic and Japan are at the top of the net-exports distribution, while other skilled-labor abundant countries such as U.S.A, Sweden, Canada, and Australia are located at the bottom.
A similar pattern is also observed in the final good computer industry. Among capital intensive countries, we find Singapore and Japan, which are among the highest net-exporters, and other countries such as Switzerland, U.S.A, Italy and France that are among the highest net-importers. Overall, the data shows evidence that contradicts the standard theory. We devote the following sections to explore this question in detail.
Results
We organize our discussion of the results in the following manner. First, we estimate the model according to the standard theory. We also present the results of the estimation of the model for two sub-samples of countries. One includes countries that are above the median corresponding to some variable. The other sub-sample corresponds to countries that are below the median of such variable. We employ variables such as the capital/labor ratio, IPRs, wage/lending rate ratio, and TFP to divide the whole sample. Second, we report the results from the estimation of the selection equation of the optimal 2-regime, 3-regime, and 4-regime model. Later, we present the estimated Rybczynski coefficients of the model that fits best the data. And we perform formal test of the null hypothesis that the Rybczynski coefficients are equivalent across regimes. Finally, we conduct some robustness checks. Table 3 presents the estimated Rybczynski coefficients under the assumption that countries employ the same technology to produce computers.
Results under the standard theory
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The Table shows that the model makes a poor job to fit the data, as none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant to explain the behavior of net-exports of computers, both in the global and final goods computer industries. The results improve when we estimate the model for different subsamples. Table 4 shows the estimation outcomes when we split the sample into two groups. One includes countries that are below the median of some variable. The other group considers countries that are above the median of such variable. We employ variables such as capital/labor ratio, IPRs, wage/lending rate ratio, and TFP to divide the sample.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Two non trivial conclusions can be drawn from Table 4 . First, the division of the sample according to variables that are relevant for technology choices improves substantially the capability of the standard theory to explain the data. Second, there is important variation in the sign and statistical significance of the explanatory variables across groups. For example, capital abundance is a source of comparative advantage in the production of computers and components for countries that are below the median of the capital/labor ratio, IPRs, and TFP, while it is a source of comparative disadvantage for countries above the median of such variables. Unskilled-labor abundance is a source of comparative advantage for countries above the median of the capital/labor ratio and IPRs, while it is a source of comparative disadvantage for countries below the median of these variables.
Results under the two-step approach
This section presents the estimation outcomes from the implementation of the two-step approach. First, we discuss the results from the estimation of the selection equation. Second, we present and comment the results from the estimation of the Rybczynski equations for each technological group. Finally, we test the null hypotheses that the Rybczynski coefficients are equivalent across regimes. Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the selection equations of the optimal 2-regime, 3-regime, and 4-regime models. The dependent variable in each model is the technology index, and the set of regressors includes: own capital/labor ratio, own IPRs, trading partners' capital/labor ratio, and trading partners' IPRs.
Selection equation
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The own capital/labor ratio, the own IPRs, and the trading partners' IPRs variables are statistically significant at 1% level both in the global and final goods computer industries. Larger values of these variables increase the probability that a country belongs to the highest technological regime, while they reduce the probability that a country belongs to the lowest technological regime. This result appears systematically in all the specifications. The impact of trading partners' capital/labor ratio is ambiguous, its estimated coefficient is significant and positive in the 2-regime model. However, it is significant and negative in the 3-regime one. The model that fits best the data is the one with three technological regimes, as it is the model that has the lowest sum of squared residuals. Table 6 presents the specification tests for this model.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The significance of the inverse of Mills Ratios for some of the regimes suggests that the lack of control for technology choices deliver selection-bias in the estimated Rybczynski coefficients. Evidence in line with this result has been provided by Fitzgerald and Hallak [12] . Table 7 presents the analogue to the Rybczynski coefficients for each technological regime, and the appendix contains a list of the countries clustered in each regime.
Rybczynski equations
[Insert Table 6 about here] For both industries, capital abundance is a source of comparative disadvantage for countries that belong to the highest regime. The coefficient corresponding to this variable is negative and statistical significant at 1% level. A 1$ increase in the relative abundance of capital leads to a 0.0000042$ (0.00076$) reduction in the net-exports of computers and components (computers) for countries that belong to regime 3. Combining information on the dependent variable for each industry and this explanatory variable, we find that a 1 standard-deviation increase in the relative abundance of capital generates a 0.34 (3.32) standard-deviations decrease in the net-exports of computers and components (computers) for countries that belong to regime 3. By contrast, capital abundance is a source of comparative advantage for countries that belong to regime 2 and regime 1 in the global and final goods computer industries, respectively. The coefficient corresponding to this variable is positive and statistical significant at 1% level. A 1$ increase in the relative abundance of capital leads to a 0.00000096$ (0.000061$) increment in the net-exports of computers and components (computers) for countries that belong to regime 2 (regime 1). A 1 standard-deviation increase in the relative abundance of capital generates a 0.74 (0.11) standard-deviations increase in the net-exports of computers and components (computers).
Skilled-labor abundance is a source of comparative advantage in the global computer industry (final good computer industry) for countries that belong to regime 3 (regime 2). A 1 worker increase in the relative abundance of qualified labor leads to a 502$ (146,000$) in the net-exports of computers and components (computers) for countries that belong to regime 3 (regime 2). A 1 standard-deviation increase in this variable generates a 0.583 (4.51) standard-deviation increase in the net-exports of computers and components (computers) for countries that belong to such regime. For all the other regimes skilled-labor abundance is statistically insignificant.
Unskilled-labor abundance is a source of comparative advantage for the production of computers and components (computers) for countries that belong to the highest regime. The coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. This pattern appears for both industries. A 1 worker increase in the relative endowment of unskilled-labor increases the net-exports of the global computer industry by 296$. The same increment generates a 9, 440$ increase in the net-exports of the final good. Regarding the economic significance, we find that a 1 standard-deviation increase in the relative endowment of this factor generates a 1.70 (0.12) standarddeviation increase in the net-exports of the global (final) computer industry for countries that belong to the highest regime. Unskilled-labor abundance has however a negative impact on the net-exports of computers and components for countries that belong to the lowest regime. A 1 worker increment in the relative endowment of this factor decreases net-exports by 3.42$. A 1 standard-deviation increment in this variable leads to reduction of 0.76 standard-deviations in the dependent variable.
Finally, land abundance is a source of comparative disadvantage in the global (final good) computer industry for countries that belong to regime 2 (regime 1). However it is a source of comparative advantage in the production of final goods for countries that belong to the highest regime. A 1 hectare increase in the relative endowment of this factor reduces net-exports in 0.041$ (2.33$). The same variation causes the net-exports of computers of the highest regime to increase in 39.1$. This effect is the largest in economic sense. A 1 standard-deviation increment in the relative endowment of land delivers a 3.14 standard-deviation increment in the net-exports of computers.
Overall, the results show a non trivial variation of the Rybczynski coefficients across technological regimes. We devote the following section to explore this statement more carefully.
Are Rybczynski coefficients equivalent across regimes?
Having presented preliminary evidence in line with our theory, we now move to provide a formal test of the null hypothesis that the Rybczynski coefficients are equivalent across regimes. Table 8 reports the p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis that the Rybczynski coefficients of the regimes in brackets are statistically equivalent.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The table shows that in spite the fact that we employ the least efficient method to estimate our theory, which increases the chance of rejecting it, there is substantial evidence supporting our model. The null hypotheses of equivalence of the Rybczynski coefficients across regimes are rejected, for most of the cases and in both industries, at 1% level. Before concluding in favor of our theory, we want to perform some robustness checks. This is presented in the following section.
Robustness checks
It may be argued, that the Rybczynski coefficients vary as a result of differences in relative factor prices. It may also be claimed, that they differ because of differences in the quality of the endowments (see Fitzgerald and Hallak [12] ). To control for these effects, we estimate two additional specifications. The first one adds to the set of explanatory variables of the selection equation, the wage/lending rate ratio. The second one, aggregates to the previous set of regressors, total factor productivity at country level.
10 Table   9 reports the results corresponding to the new estimations of the selection equations.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
In the first of the new estimations, the relative factor price appears to be insignificant, and thereby it plays no role to explain the variation of the Rybczynski coefficients across technological regimes. However, this pattern reverses in the last model, where increases in the wage/lending rate ratio reduce the probability that a country belongs to the highest technological regime. By contrast, TFP is significant and has a positive effect on the probability of belonging to that regime. A remarkable finding is that after controlling for the new variables, the sign and statistical significance of the regressors of the baseline model remain intact. Furthermore, the absolute value of the estimated coefficients of variables strongly related to our theory such as own capital/labor ratio, own IPRs, and trading partners' IPRs, are larger than in the baseline estimation. The specification tests for this model are reported in Table 10 .
[Insert Table 10 about here] An interesting result is that the coefficients that control for selection are, at least for two regimes, statistically significant. This is a notable finding that shows that controlling for TFP is not enough to remove selection bias from the estimated Rybczynski coefficients, which suggests that technologies vary across countries in a non-Hicks-neutral manner. To conclude, we present the results from the estimation of the Rybczynski equations, and the formal test of equivalence of these coefficients across regimes. Tables 11 and 12 reports respectively these results.
[Insert Table 11 about here] Once again, the results provide evidence in line with our theory. 10 The Appendix contains a description of the definition and sources of each of these variables.
Conclusion
The neoclassical model of trade predicts that international specialization will be jointly determined by cross-country differences in relative factor endowments and exogenous technology levels. In this paper we develop a model that relaxes the Hicks neutral technology assumption by allowing countries to adopt their own technologies. The marriage of literatures on biased technical change and trade yields a tractable theory whereby differences in factor endowments bias the technical change towards particular factors of production, and thus unit factor input requirements vary across economies. Using data on net exports of a single industry, computers, and factor endowments for 73 countries over the period 1980-2000 we test the theory. The descriptive and econometric results provide robust evidence that once technological choices are considered, countries with different factor endowments can become net exporters of the same product. 
and λ is the shadow price of the constraint. Since [Φ
, we can divide the first order condition for variety i by that for variety n and obtain the following expression
Multiplying both size of equation (21) Note: Th is table shows the res ults of the estimation of neoclassical Rybczynski equations, both for the global com puter industry (final goods and com ponents) and for t he final good computer industry. The dependent variables are net -exports of computers for each indust ry. The independent variables are capi tal abund ance, skilled-labor abun dance, un skilled-labor abundance and l and abundance. The results con trol for tim e effects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** means statistically signifi cant at 1% level, ** mean s statistically significant at 5% level, and * mean s statistically signifi cant at 10% level.
Global computer ind ustry (final goods and components)
Final good computer industry Note: Th is table shows the res ults of the estimation of the Rybczynski equations for the 3-regime m odel, both for the global computer indu stry (final goods an d comp on ents) and for th e final good computer ind ustry. The dep endent variables are net-exports of computers for each industry. The indep endent variables are capital abundance, skilled-labor abundance, unskilled-labor abundance and land abundance. The results control for th e "consumption effect" and time effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets . *** m eans statistically significant at 1% level, ** means s tat isti cally signi fi cant at 5% level, and * means stat isti cally signi fi cant at 10% level.
Global computer industry (final goods and components)
Final good computer industry Note: Th is table shows the res ults of the estimation of the Rybczynski equations for the 3-regi me model, both for the global computer indu stry (final goods and components) and for the final good computer industry. The dependent variables are net-exports of computers for each industry. The independen t variables are capital abundance, skilled-lab or abundance, unskilled-labor abundance and land abun dance. The results control for the "consumption effect" and time effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** means statistically s ignificant at 1 % level, ** means statistically significant at 5% level, and * means stati stically significant at 10% level. 
